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Most of the theoretical literature on price-setting behavior deals with the special case in
which only a single price is changed. At the retail-store level, at least, where dozens of products
are sold by a single price-setter, price-setting policies are not formulated for individual products.
This feature of economic behavior raises a host of questions whose answers carry interesting
implications. Are price setters staggered in the timing of price changes? Are price changes of
different products synchronized within the store? If so, is this a result of aggregate shocks or
of the presence of a store-specific component in the cost of adjusting prices? Can observed small
changes in prices be rationalized by a menu cost model? We exploit the multiproduct dimension
of the dataset on prices used in Lach and Tsiddon (1992a) to explore several of these and other
issues. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical work on this subject.
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Oneof the most important lessons learned from the Fischer-Taylor analysis of staggered contracts
is that the mechanism responsible for the long lag In the response of the aggregate price level to shocks
in the money supply relies crucially on the assumption of staggered contracts. If agents ftilly synchronize
their actions, the maximum lag of the aggregate response to shocks in the money supply is the length of
the contract.
The logic of this argument applies in the price-setting context as well. Under flail information,
a necessary condition for changes in the aggregate price level to lag behind shocks in the money supply
is that the response of price-setters to the monetary shock is staggered over time. Since not all price-
setters change their prices simultaneously, each price-setter takes into account that some of his
competitors have not yet changed their prices which prevents him from changing his own product? prices
to fully accommodate the change in the money supply. Hence changes in the aggregate price level lag
behind changes in the money supply.
As shown by Caplin and Spulber (1987), staggering may not be sufficient to generate lags in the
response of the aggregate price level, even when price-setters change prices discontinuously. It is,
however, always a necessary condition to generate such lag.'
In Lath and Tsiddon (1992; hereafter L&T). we analyzed store-level, monthly price data of 26
food products sold in Israel during high inflation periods. Figure 1, reproduced from lAST, shows that
price changes do indeed seem to be staggered: in any single month the proportion of price changes is
never close either to zero or to one, and it is fairly constant over the 18 months analyzed; it hovers
around 30 percent, which is consistent with an average duration of a nominal price quotation of 2.5-3
months.
Note that the staggering referred to above, and in the macroeconomic literature in general, is
See also Ball and Ceccbetti (1988), Caballero and Engel (1991. 1993) and Taiddon (1993).2
acrossdecision-makers (price-setters), not across products. Most of the theoretical and empirical
literature on price-setting behaviorfocuseson the single-product case, thus avoiding the conceptual
ambiguity in the concept of staggering. Nevertheless, the presence of multiproduct firms raises the
possibility that the staggering of price changes occurs across products and not across price-setters.2 For
example,suppose that price-setterssell the same 9 products and change the prices of the first three
productsin month I,ofthesecond three products inmonth 2 and ofthelast threein monthS. In month
4 they startthecycleagain. We willthen observethat a third of allpricesare changed in each month.
Thereason is staggering across(groups of) products and perfect synchronization of all price-setters. Of
course, thesame observednumberof changesis obtained whena thirdofthe storeschangeall 9prices
in monthI, anotherthird doessoinmonth 2,and the remainingthirdof allstores changes prices in
month 3, The reasonhere,however,isstaggering of price-setters inthetiming oftheirprice changes
accompaniedwith perfect synchronization of pricechanges withineachstore.
Thisextreme example shows that the sameobserved datacanresult fromdiametrically opposed
causes.The problem with Figure I is that it does not distinguish betweenchangesin products' prices
within astoreoracross stores. This paper willtacklethisissue andshed somelighton theforces
responsible forstaggeredprice changes. Distinguishing betweenprices-setters andproducts' staggering
is important formacroeconomic analysis.
Our analysisleadsustoconcludethatFigure I is theresultofstaggeringacross price-setters,
whileprice changes ofdifferent products are synchronized, althoughnothilly,withinthe store. Thatis,
thedata exhibit across-storesstuntingand within-store synchronization in the timing of price changes.
This findingvalidates the assumption of staggereddecisionsacrossprice-settersmadeinmost ofthe
'sticky prices'literature.
Wealso thinkthat theexistence of within-storesynchronization fitsbetter the implications of
'Tommasi(1993a) seemsto be thefirst to address this issue.3
modelsof price-setting behavior based on the presence of convex costs of adjusting prices (menu cost
models),thanthose of models based on imperfect information, or those of models based on search
equilibrium with no convexities. The following example explains why.
Suppose an aggregate shock arrives at the store —howwill it react? According to signal
extraction models, a store will change the prices of all its products in a manner directly related to the size
of the shock. According to menu costs models, if the store faces costs of adjusting the price of each
product,and ifthese costs have a store-specific component, then not all stores will necessarily change
their prices. Becauseofthis fixed costcomponent,stores that do change prices willtend tosofor most
of theirproducts. Furthermore, thereisnoclear-cut relationship between the size of thepricechange
and thesizeof theshock. The implications of the lastapproachare lessobvious since, tothebestofour
knowledge,there existsno modelof a multiproduct search equilibrium. Itseemslikely,however, that
a firm insuch anequilibrium will respondto anaggregate shockbychanging only some ofits, prices
upon impact,postponingother products' price changes for a while. Changing all pricestogethermay
generatetoostrongasignal which is liabletodrive consumers away.
This line of reasoning indicates thatwithin-storesynchronization in the timing of price changes
tends to accord more with menu cost models, where some of these costs are specific to the store (and not
to the products), than with the other two explanations.'
The observation of small price changes in the data is often brought up as evidence against the
relevance of menu costs models. In this paper we claim that such small changes can be expected when
a multiproduct firm is subject to costs of adjusting prices that have a firm-specific component.In this
case,theoptimal change in the price of a single product may indeed be small. What should notbe
observed if store-specific costs exist is flsimultaneous pricechanges in the store being small. Indeed,
Obviously, the three explanations do not contradict one another. In some cases it is useM to consider some
or all ol these explanations together(e.g.,Benabou, 1988).4
the data show that the average change within a store is large.
The paperis organizedas follows: next sectionbrieflydescribestheprice data. In Section 3,
across-storesstaggering in the timing of price changesis analyzed.The evidence on within-store
synchronization ispresentedin Section 4. Section S investigates the timing of negative price changes.
Section 6 interprets theaccumulated evidence, and Section 7 deals with the importance of store-specific
menucosts from various perspectives. Conclusions close thepaper.
2.Descriotign of the data
The datausedin thisworkis a subsample ofthe data used in[AcT, where itisdescribed in
detail.Theoriginal data set consistsof nominalprice quotations for 26 foodproducts collected monthly
froma sample of stores by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for the purpose of computing the
consumer priceindex (CPl).' That is, for each product we have a panel ofpricesextending acrossstores
andover time. Alternatively, for each store we have a panel of prices extending over products and over
time.
The products in the sample are all homogeneous, did not changesubstantially either in quality
or in market structure, and their prices were not controlled by thegovernment during the period of
investigation.
Since part of the focus of the current study is on issues related to theco-movement of prices
within stores, we selected 21 products that could be grouped into two broad classes:wines and meat
products.' Note that each store in our data sells either wine or meat products. None of thestores in our
These are grocery or liquor stores; supermarkets and chain storesare not included in the sample.
Wine products consist of 9 wInes and liquors; agrack (anise), whiis vermouth,liquor, champagne, vodka, red
wine, rosd wine, hock wine and sweetredwino. The 12 meat products, including three types of fish, are: fresh
beef,frozengoulash, frozen beef liver, fresh beef liver, chickenbreast,chicken liver, turkeybreast,beefsteak,
dnzmsucks, fish fillet, bun fish and codfish.S
samplesell both wines and meat.
The periods for whichmost ofthe data are available are 1978-1979,1981-1982,and the first nine
months of 1984, beforeacross-the-boardpricecontrols were putfirst into effect. Thedatafor 1980and
1983have disappearedfrom the CBS archives. The analysis in this paper Is restricted to the 1978-1979:6
subperiod,correspondingto a single inflationary step as defined byLiviatanand Piternian (1986).because
the price-durationdataare less affected bythe 1 month truncationintroduced bythe samplinginterval.'
The object of studyistheoccurrenceofa pricechange.Inordertotake accountofround-off
errorsthis event is defined to occur whenever a observed price change exceeds half a percent.
In the latter part of this paper we analyze the within-store dimension of the data. For this to be
meaningM we focus on stores selling three or more products. The upper graph in Figure 2 plots the
number of stores meeting this requirement by product class. Twice as many stores sell meat than wines,
and the numberof storesis stableover time.7The number of products, averaged over stores, is given
in thelower graph: itfluctuatesbetween5.5and6productswitha standarddeviationof2-2.5products.
Thereis not muchvariationover time in these averages. There is variation, however, in the number of
products actually sampled across stores —thereare relatively more meat stores selling fewerproducts
than liquor stores, and only a few meat stores sell over 9 products.
3.Across-storesstanerin2
As mentioned in the Introduction, a necessary condition fir an effective monetary policy is that
not all price-setters should change their prices simultaneously in response to a monetary shock. If this
is so, each price-setter takes into account that some of his competitors have not yet changed their prices
'During this period the mean inflation rate was 3.9paves!per month, with sninddeviationof 1.9percent.
The median rate was 3.5percentper month.
7In L&T we showed that overt though there were sent cbaages over time in the identity of the stores, there
isasizable core of stores that remained in the sample for long periods of time.6
which, in turn, prevents him from changing those of his own products to fully accommodate the monetary
shock. Hence, the aggregate price level may not respond completely and immediately to unexpected
changes in monetary policy.
This lackof simultaneity is termed 'across-storesstaggering". Theterm refersto staggering in
thetimingofpricechangesacross different stores for a gjy product. In most macroeconomic models
(e.g..Fischer, 1977), across-stores staggering impliesmore thanmere lackofsimultaneity;Italso
embodies the notionof'regularcyclicity"in theresponseof price-setterstoa shock. One group of price-
settersis first to change prices, thllowed by anothergroupof differentprice-setters;at some pointin
time,however,before the secondgroup actsagain, the firstgroup of price-setterschangesits prices a
second time.' Ourdataare uniquely suitedtocheck theextent to whichthese phenomena prevail.This
isthepurpose of this section.
At this stage let us clarify the relationshipbetweenstatisticai independence across stores and
staggering. Let X =1indicate that store i changed the price ofproductj in month t. Otherwise, X
=0.Obviously, the timing of price changes is correlatedacrossstores, implying thatthe {} process
exhibits some form of cross-sectional dependency (across stores i). The critical point is that this
correlation may result because of the stores' response to factors common to all stores (e.g., to an increase
in the aggregate rate of inflation), and not because of strategic behavior. In fact, given thatour data are
composed of small grocery stores located all over the country (we do not sample supermarkets), this is
not a bad assumption. Hence the assertion that some stores act on the premise that some of their
competitors have not yetchangedtheir prices Is not interpreted literally as "neck-to neck" competition.
Letting Z, denote all the common factors alluded to above we assume that conditional on 4the
probability of store i changing the price of some product is not affected by what store k does or did.
'A unique exception in this context is Calvo (1983). While Cilvo's model isnay useful for understanding
the dynamics of inflation, its empüical inadequacy at the micro level has beenpointed out by Taylor (1983).7
That is, conditional on (7.), the process (XJ is independent across i. Hereafter, independence across
stores refers to conditional independence.
This section is divided into three pans, each presenting empirical evidence on differentfeatures
of across-stores staggering in the timing of price changes.
A. Pronortion of yrice cbanes
The first step is to examine, for each product, the time series of the proportion of stores that
changed prices. Simultaneity or lack of staggering implies that stores either change their prices together
or do not, i.e., that the observed proportions are close to one or to zero.
Figure 3 presents such a time series for the 17 months between February 1978 and June 1979,
for each product. At first glance, the proportion of stores changing prices is well below 1 in all months,
with the exception of November 1978. The requirement that these proportions be above zero is also
satisfied though to a lesser extent. Omitting the November 1978 observation, meat products do not
exhibit much variability over time compared to wines. Wines, on the other hand, display a quite regular
seasonal pattern with a much lower proportion of stores changing prices during the first half of the year.
In a stationaxy inflation environment a store following an (S-s) pricing policy is expected to
change its prices by the same amount every 6 months (6 being determined by the parameters of the
inflation process and profit function (Sheshiuski-Weiss; see 1992). What does this imply for the
observed proportions of stores changing prices? If stores are expected to change prices every 6 months,
and there is sufficient heterogeneity in the initial conditions, then after a long enough number of months,
the proportion of stores changing prices every month should stabilize around 1/6. The horizontal dotted
line in each panel of Figures 4 and 5 is 1/6,where6 is the average duration of a price quotation taken
'In expectations, the store's policy is obseivalionally equivilait to itisne-dependealt policy.8
fromTable 4inL&T.'° The 'fit' seems to be much better for meat products than for wines.
B.Simultaneous nrice chanees
The issue ofstaggeringcanbetackled fromanotherangle by asking: how manystores change
prices simultaneously? When store ichangesthepriceof productj during month t, Maotherstores are
doingthe same.Tables Al and A2 in the Appendix show the grand mean ML., Ma averaged over months
and products soldby score i, foreach store i (column 1).Column 2 shows Madividedby the number
of competitors, the number of stores selling product jast minus I, aiso averaged over months and
products. For example, store 1 in Table Al changes the price of a typical wine product simultaneously
with 7.3 other stores on average. (45percentof its competitors). Summary statistics of these tables are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Simultaneous Price Changes
Summary Statistics of Tables Al and 42
MEANMEDIAN STD MIN MAX
WINESM 6.90 6.32 2.50 2.83 14
WINES Share 0.42 0.40 0.14 0.20 0.87
MEAT ML 15.24 17.31 4.66 6.8 23.4
MEAT Share 0.56 0.57 0.06 0.37 0.71
bce: SeenotestoTableAl
"Note that the avenge durationwasestimated 1mm data on positive price changes only. This may be more
appropriate for our purposes. The occurrence of negative price changesrepresents only 12 percent of the total number of obervatjogs9
Whena store selling wines changes one of its prices it usually does so together with 7 other stores
(42 percent of its competitors) on average. These figures are quite representative: 62.5 percent of the
stores change price simultaneously with 5-9otherstores; 50 percent of the stores change prices at the
same time that 32-52 percent of their competitors do so. Most stores selling meat products usually
change prices simultaneously with 56 percent of their competitors; the interquartile range is only 6
percent."
The preceding analysis indicates that the proportion of stores is away from the zero-one
boundaries in general; furthermore, from the point of view of the individual store, a change in prices does
not indicate that all of its competitors follow suit, even though a sizable share of them do.
C.Re2ularcvclicitv
Anothercharacteristic of across-stores staggering is not captured either by the observed
proportions of price changes or by the number of simultaneous moves. As the opening paragraph of this
section suggested, having the aanigroupof firms change prices every month during the first, say, six
months, while another group does so during the second part of the year, is ngthekind of staggering
economists have in mind when analyzing price dynamics; it doesconform with the notion of regular
cyclicity. This is also not the behavior implied by the (S-s) model of price changes. Staggering embodies
a notion of regular cyclicity.
The 'perfecC across-stores staggering is one In which, in response to a monetary shock, a
different t/ô of all stores changes prices every month. After S months all stores have responded to the
shock and the cycle can start again. Hence, the perfect time series of X is composed of ones every 6
monthsand zeros everywhere else.
11esfiguresare averages sad should be treated with caution. For each stoic there is variation both in the
number of months sampled within each product and in the number of pioducla sold.10
Weexamine the X time series for each store I and productJ. There are potentially 360 and
1,080 such series for wines and meat products respectively.' We focus on the occurrence of
consecutive price changes; a pattern not consistent with across-store staggering in the timing of price
changes. For our purposes, this is more informative than descriptive statistics on the duration of price
quotationsfor eachstore. We count the number of times prices were observed to change consecutively
atleasttwice,atleast three times, and so on. The counting is done for eachstoreseparately over all the
products sold bythestore and over the months for which data form it are available (the maximum being
17 months per product). Since the number of products sold and the number of months for which there
are data vary over stores, we divide the observed number of K consecutive price changes by the notential
numberofK consecutive price changes, for 2 ￿ K s17.The entries in Tables A3 and A4 can thus
beinterpretedas unconditional probabilities ofobservingK consecutive price changesY Table 2
presentssummarystatistics.
For example, there are 40 distinct stores selling some oldie 9 wine products. Potentially there are 360 series,
but a non-negligible number of them axe missing since exist stores do not sell ail9products.
"We count non-overlapping spells ofsecutive price changes. For example, &spellof 4 consecutive changes
is counted only once as a spell of 4 and not as 3 spells of 2 or 2 spells of 3. The qualifier at least'is important.
Since our data are censored from both sight and left, there are many instances in which a spell of two consecutive
price changes is preceded or followed by a missing value. The censoring results either from a store not being
included in the sample in • pazticuJar month or from the store having run out of the product at the time of nmpling.
The potential number of K consecutive price changes is derived as followE first, we i4aiti, the spells of
L consecutsve observations onX,, 2 ￿ 1. ￿ 17. The reason for having spells of varying size is thepresence of
lots of missing values in the X's. Neat, for each spell of length L we count the number of possibleways K non-
overlapping consecutive price changes, X, —1,can ar. We then aimoverall observed spells.F 0
example,store 1 sells 7 wine products. The number of times two consecutive price changes occurs is 2,0,0, 1, 0,0 and 1 respectively.The observed number of two consecutive price changes ii, therefore, 4. We identified
2 spells or? consecutive non-missirgX' s (in products 1 and 9), 3 spells of 6 (in products 2, 6 and7), 1 spell of 5(inproduct 8), one spell of 3 (in product 3) and one spell of 2 (in product 3). The potential number oftwo
consecutive price changes is, therefore, 14. The Cl entry for store lii 4114a 0.286.Table 2: Probability oft Consecutive Price Changes































































































lote: The mean pronability [OtCAD-CUI. less thatU.U1; seealso notes to [ante A3.
From Table A3 we see that close to 40 percent of the liquor itores never spread out a change in
the price of any of its products over two or more months (C2-C17 have zero entries in 15 stores). The
estimated probability of spreading out a price change over two or three consecutive months is quite low
(except for stores 1, 2 and 9). The mean probability, averaged over stores, is 8.3 percent, while the
median probability is only 5 percent, reflecting the large number of zero values. Even without their
standard errors, these estimates suggestthatconsecutive price changes are not a prevalent phenomenon
in liquor stores.
Table A4 indicates that most stores selling meat products experienced two, three and even four
consecutive price changes at least once. Although infrequent -themean probability Is never above 19
percent -theseevents do occur often enough to warrant a different characterization than liquor stores.
Note that a non-negligible number of stores do have 5ormore consecutive price changes. Unlike liquor
stores, the notion of across-stores staggering in the timing of price changes finds less support in the meat-
products market. We return to this point at the end of the section.12
A different perspective on the issue of regular cyclicityisalso instructive. A modest requirement
for staggering to occur is that stores alternate their decisions to change prices, I.e., that stores that change
pricesinthe current month did not do so the month before and, conversely, stores that changed prices
last month donotdosothis month." Note that this behavior Is not sufficient to generate staggering.
Ifstoresdobehave thisway,ngif thereissufficientheterogeneityinthe stores'initial conditions,
across-stores staggeringwillbeoccur. Otherwise, the result may be a situation where all stores do indeed
alternate their price changes but do so in a synchronized thshlon. Note, however, that the latter
theoreticai possibility is not supported by our findings in the previous subsectionQ'
A simple 2*2 contingency table with two rows for the values of Xi,., and two columns for the
values of X, summarizes this information for each store-product-month observation. Assuming thatX
is (conditionally) independent and identically distributed across stores allows us to aggregate the tables
overstores)Thisstillleaves us with 17*21tablesfor each product-month combination. Assuming
that the distributionofX, is time-invariant during the 17 months reduces the information to 21 2*2 tables
(9 winesand12meatproducts). Table 3 presents these contingency tables.
' Anempirical check of this assertion is meaningflil only if stores are sampled more often than the frequency
of price changes which is the case in the 1978-1976:6 period.
"To see this consider a case where the probability of i price change at tgivenisO ifX,,.1 =1or lii
0. Stores nit one month between price changes. Suppose there is heterogeneity in that half thestone start with a —change.Then in any two consecutive .nnnthatherewill always be different halves of the stores
changing price. If there is no initial heterogeneity, MI stores change price.every other month. Hence, alternating
behavior is not mificient to generate aaose-one staggering in. the timing ofprice changes. In this context,
Caballero and Engel (1991, 1993) show that it the number of stores selling the product isconstant over time, if the
conditional probability or changing the price is the nine sane. stores and is time-invariant, and if thestores behave
tndependantly of each other, in the limit, the proportion of stores changing pSe is constant over time.
"Note that this assumption allows for heterogeneity in the size of theprice change.TabLe 3: 2x2 Contingency TabLes
Wine Products
13
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The frequency counts over stores and months of the event represented by each cell are used to
computeprobabilities.The top entry in each cell is the row percentage which is the maximum likelihood
estimator oftheprobabilityof; given X. The bottomentryis thecolumn percentage whichis the
maximum likelihoodestimator ofthe probability of X, given X. Lettingthe firstcoordinate be the
valueof X att-1 andthesecond itsvalueatt then 0.26 inthe (0,1) cellofthe firstcontingencytable is
the probabilityof a liquorstore changingthepriceof product 1 at t given that he did not change that
price in the previousmonth, while0.72 isthe probabilitythat inthe lastperiod a store didnotchange
the pricegiventhat theprice is changedat t.
The only implications of across-stores staggering are that the (0,1) and (1,0) entries are large
relative to the (1,1) entry. In probability terms, the probability ofJ1Qprice change at t-1 conditional on
a change at t is larger than the probability of a price change at t-1 conditional on a change at t (column
percent); and, the probability ofprice change at t conditional on a change at t-l is larger than the
probability of a price change at t conditional on a change at t-1 (row percent).
Liquor stores easily satisfy these implications, a finding consistent with the relativly small number
of price changes in consecutive months. Meat stores do not.
We can summarize this information by averaging over products. Aggregating over products
instead of over months yields 17 contingency tables. This averaging is appropriate to the extent that there
are no systematic differences in the probability of a price change across products which may be the case
in our data (see Section 4.A). Since there is a natural ordering to them we graph their entries against
the time axis. The top panels in Figure 4 show the proportion of stores that changed prices at t but not
at t-l, out of all stores that changed price at t. Let this proportion be denoted by Qrn. is the
conditional probability ofX.1 =0given X =I,which canbe computed from each month's16
contingency table by averaging the column percentage of the (0,1) cell over J products.t' This
probability is to be compared to the average column percentage of the(1,1) cell,Q11.
Theother entry of interest in these tables is the (1,0) cell: the number of stores changing price
at V.! but not at I. The average row percentage in this case is denoted by P10 it estimates the conditional
probability of X =0given X, =1,and is to be compared with the average row percentage of the
(1,1) cell, P11.Thebottom panels in Figure 4 plot these probabilities against time.
These plots confirm our previous finding that liquor stores are characterized by what we term
regular cyclicity in the timing of price changes: P is below P,1 only in November 1978 and June
1979, while Q0,isnever below Q11.Thispattern of price changes is not that characteristic of the meat-
products market. This conclusion is also supported by Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix, which present
the ratios ,a1,andQ01/Q,, over time for each product separately.
In this section we analyze three features of the data: the proportion of price changes, the number
of simultaneous moves and the phenomenon of regu$ar cyclicity. The behavior of liquor stores matches
the predictions of a model in which stores are staggered in the timing of each product's price changes.
These new findings reinforce the conclusion reached in TAT that prices of wine products are slow to
adjust, with the proviso that the timing of the price changes is staggered across liquor stores.
The results for stores selling meat products are mixed. The proportion of price changes are






whereXis 9 (wines) or 12 (west products), 1(A,B) is the indicator function whose value is 1 when both A and B
occur, and Zero otherwise, and ?4isthe set of stores for which the price of productj is recorded in months t, t-1
and t-2.17
of theircompetitors.Therefore, these stores' behavior exhibits characteristics of across-stores staggering.
In many cases, however, the behavior of these stores is not in accordance with the concept of regular
cyclicity— in some instances blatantly so.
Thedifference in behaviorbetweenthe two markets, meat products and wines, is certainly
interesting, but before we speculate on the reasons for this difference, we should consider the possibility
that it is an artifact of the data. For across-stores staggering to be observed we require, in addition to
staggering in the tinting of price changes across stores, that the duration of a price quotation be greater
than one month (the sampling interval). Otherwise, if all prices change within a month, we will not
detect across-stores staggering by our definition even though the timing of the price changes may indeed
be staggered within the month. Put differently, those stores not exhibiting regular cyclicity defined on
a monthly basis may be satis'ing a higher frequency regular cyclicity which cannot be observed given
the one month length of the sampling interval. Since the average duration of a price within this group
of stores is less than two months —theunweighted mean is 132 with a standard deviation of 0.22 (Fable
4 in L&T) -storesselling meat products may fail to show staggering simply because we cannotdetect
this behavior given our sampling frequency, not because the timing of prices changes are not staggered.
The quantitative implications of this argument can be gauged by analyzingthefollowing
benchmark case. Consider a one-product environment with a constant and deterministic rate of inflation
and perfect staggering where prices changes once every 45 days and the sampling frequency is 30
days." inthisscenario, half the stores will exhibit 2 consecutive price changes. No store will have
any consecutive price changes when the duration of a price quotation is 2 months or more. When the
average duration is 1.12 we are bound to expect some stores to fail the regular cyclicity test. Given the
heterogeneity across products, stores and time present in our data it is, however, a formidable task to
"In this example, perfect staggering occum &then each firm change. its price exactly every 45daysand &
measuaof exactly 1/45offirms (ignoring integer problems) changes its price every day.18
derive the exact benchmark number to which our results ought to be compared with. The upshot of this
disclaimer is that the observation of stores failing to exhibit regular cyclicity defined on a monthly basis
is not necessarily evidence against the hypothesis of across-stores staggering.
What are the implications of our finding that stores stagger their price changes in acyclical
patternwithineachproduct market? First, this feature clearly undermines the view that sector (product)
speciric shocks guide the inflationary process (Bruno and Sachs, 1985). Infact,the staggering of price
changes over time smoothsdownsectoral shocks and thereforemitigates,or at least spreads out, their
impact n aggregate variables.
Second,thesmall number of consecutive price changes goes against the notion that price rigidity
emerges from a gradual "search and adjust" process, as suggested by some search models ('Zeira, 1987;
Rob, 1991). This implication, however, is not a surprising one since, in thesetype of search models,
gradual adjustment emerges from jçgj pre-commitment (adjustment costs, irreversibility). Sinceprices
are always set in nominal terms, a high rate of inflation makes the commitment to a real pricea reversible
decision. When the rate of inflation is 4 percent per month, itseenis that the effect ofirreversibility on
decision making isnotthat strong.19
Across-stores staggering raises questions on the empirical Implications of signal extraction models
of price-setting behavior. The structure of the shocks thatcan generate the observed sorting over time
of stores should not only discriminate across stores but doso cyclically. This is very unlikely to occur.
Nonetheless, one may think of the pattern of regular cyclicity and staggeringas emerging from the
geographic heterogeneity of monetary shocks. We rebut this view in Section 6.
Across-stores staggering occurs in the market for each individual product, Le., in theacross-
If our conjecture that inflation erodes commitment is true,our findings are appropriate for highinflation
levels only. If the reasons for price rigiditymay differ between low and high rates of inflation, inflationary
dynamics would differ accordingly. Tommasi (1993b) buildsa search model where inflation erodes the
informational content of prices. He shows that at some —thiseffect dominates so that search loses its i,otential
and declines in equilibrium.19
stores dimension. In foodstuffs, as in most products, stores (price-setters) aeJl many different products.
The natural question to ask is whether stores, as multiproduct firms, make use of this fact to learn about
the inflationary process, or are adjustment costs lumpy enough to prevent such search activity?
This issue is crucial when trying to discriminate among the different models of price-setting
behavior.If storesdo change different products' prices on different dates one could interpret regular
cyclicityas a costlysearch process where each changeina specific price is an investment in discovering
theaggregate shock.Ifso, signalextractioncan still beadominantfactorat the level of the price-setter
eventhough eachspecificproductmarket exhibitsboth staggeringandregularcyclicity. In addition,
whentrade is sequential (Lucas and Woodford, 1993;Eden,1994),store-levelprice dynamicsmay
closelyresemblethe dynamics of rigid prices but its implications for the aggregate level are very
different. This similarity at the store level, however, breaks down when the store is a multiproduct firm.
Extensions of the signal extractions and sequential trading models would suggest the presence of within-
store sta2gerinE in addition to the observed across-store staggering. By this we mean that when a firm
sells many products it should tend to change the prices of some products each date rather than lumping
all price changes together.
In order to address this isomorphism between the store-level implications of different models of
price-setting behavior, and also because it is interesting in its own right, we analyze the within-store
dimension of the data.
4. Within-store synchronization
The issue is whether stores tend to change the prices of different products simultaneously. That
is, we ask whether or not the change in the price of a particular product in a particular store is usually
accompanied by changes in other products' prices in the same store. If suck simultaneity exists we call
it within-store synchronization.20
Note that we investigate synchronization in the timing of changes in the prices of different
products sold in a single store. Other related issues, such as the cross-correlation in the size of the price
changes, are not explored. Synchronization in the timing of price changes may have very different
implications from thoseofcorrelation in the size of change. We comment briefly on this issue in Section
6.
A. Pronortion of Price Changes
Anatural measure of thedegree ofwithin-store synchronization istheproportionof products
whoseprices changedduring amonth. In ournotation, this proportionis
(2)
IGSIJ€*7,
whereG• is the set of products whose prices were recorded in store i during months t-1 and t (i.e., the
number of products sold at t-l and t, or the number of non-missing values of X) and IGUisthe
cardinality of the set. We actually definefor the subsample of stores that sell at least three products
in each class, IGJ￿ 3. Recall that the stores in our sample sell either meat products or wines, but not
both. Hence, synchronization between classes of products cannot be addressed with these data.
We start by asking what values of p should be expected when there is within-store
synchronization. Clearly, we cannot provide a definite answer to this question without a structural model,
A problem with 915 that we do not know whether morn than one change in price occurred within the month1
so that an observedof 1 can be the resujt of different values for 'idefinedon, say, a weekly basis. Our
definition of synchronization allows (or this possibility so that two products are said to be synchronized if one
changes its price the first day of the month and the other does so the last day of the mat month. Another issue
is that we sample a small fraction of the products sold by the store so that the true ç may bevery different from
the observed .Ourresults an, of course, conditional on the sample. To the extent that the sample of products
within each class is rindom we could carry over the conclusions of the analysis to the entire population in each class
of products.21
but we can be fairly confident that when inflation is as high as it was during the period -3.9percent per
month —theprobability of a store not changing zi of its products' prices during a month is very low
when the decision to change price is independent across products. Hence, observing many 's equal to
zero should be indicative of within-store-synchronization.2 Table 4 presents the frequency
distribution of 'p, for wines and meat products.








































The differencebetweenwine and meat products is quite striking. While most of the
observations in wines correspond to =0,the distribution of for meat products is much more
balanced. If E= 0is the only positive evidence for synchronization in the tinting of price changes
fljisimportant to recall that there was no slowdown in the rate of inflation during this period.
The mme conclusion could be reached if all prices wen changed during the month, 1. A problemwith
this conclusion is that, given a positive rate of inflation, and with a long enough interval of time between samplings,
a store will eventually change all its prices and we will observe —1.To deduce that there is synchronizstjon
acrose products is, of count, misleading. In this case, ç 1 is evidence of nothing but the fact that the frequency
of sampling is too low relative to the rate of inflation. Hence we should be cautious in the interpretation of c's
equal to one. We do not, however, believe this is an issue in our data. Recall that in this period, when the average
monthly rate of inflation was 3.9 percent, the avenge duration of a price quotation was 2.2 months. Had we used
quarterly data, ow de6nition of synchronization would guarantee that we find perfect within-store synchronization
in the data. But since we use monthly data, the severeness of this problem is reduced. In particular, note that for
wine products the avenge duration of a price quotation is 4 months.22
across products we must conclude that most wine stores synchronize the timing of the price changes
of their products, while stores selling meat products do so to a lesser extent?
In the remainder of this section we present additional evidence favoring the within-store
synchronization hypothesis. We provide formal tests of the hypothesis, but doing so requires a series
of compromising assumptions. It is therefore comforting to note that the direct evidence and
conclusions from Table 4 bold up to more formal analysis.
The expected value ofis
(3)
IaIja.
whereP Prob{X, =l}is the unconditional probability of observing a price change in productj
at store i during month t.
The null hypothesis to be tested is the case of no within-store synchronization. This is
interpreted as stating that the sequence (XVI) is pairwise independent over products j.Underthis





Inan attempt to see whether the heterogeneity in the number of products sold by the store,,hasan effect
on the conclusions because ofl possible effect of IGonp, we divided the observations into those corresponding
to stores having 3 ￿ IGj￿ 5 and those with G 6. The conclusions were similar to those of Table 4.23
isapproximately distributed as a standard normal variable. If {Xa} Is a sequence of independent
randomvariablesover stores i, then
- a TI. (5)
where N, is the set of stores with non-missingç at time t.
We focus on T since IGIisrelatively smaller than N in our data. 'Tisnot a statistic since it
depends on unknown parameters. Note that neither E() nor V(ç) are observed nor does the null
hypothesis speci' their value. E() and V() have to be estimated and for this we need estimators of
the probabilities of a price change in all the products. Under the null hypothesis we do not
need to estimate the joint probability of X,...,Xa and then integrate out the marginal probabilities.
Thus, under the null hypothesis, estimation of P is greatly simplified since It allows us to ignore the
information embodied in the behavior of the other products. Since P cannot be estimated for every
store-product-month observation we have to make some assumptions. The first one is
{X0j is lid over i. (Al)
This assumption restricts the probability of a price change to be the same across stores, but
allows for heterogeneity in the size of the price change. For all stores i, P, =P.Note that E(co)
and V(,j may vary across stores because of differences in the number and composition of products
sold at time t.
Wenow consider two distinct scenarios for es atingP. The first scenario assumes
{X4j is independent, not identically distributed, over t. (A2)24
AssumingAland A2, a consistent estimator of P under the nullhypothesisIs the sample
mean of X over stores i
(6)
whereN, is the setof stores sellingproductj in monthst andt-l.
Thisestimator of the unconditional probability of a price change was analyzed in Section 3.A
and plotted in Figure 3 fbi every product. X is the proportion of stores changing product js price at
t.When substituting the P's by the sample meansofthe ;'s the test hasthenice feature that it
comparesameasure inthewithin-storedimension with a measure inthe across-store dimension. We
will returntothis interpretation after presentingthe resultsof thetest.
Thesecond scenario for estimating l' takes explicit account of the dynamicsin the;
process. Assume
P(X / 13=PtX/ X.j. (AT)
This assumption statesthatthe probability of observing X conditionalonallthe relevant
information available to store i at time1,jk, is the sameasthatprobability conditional onlyon
information on what happened to product jduringthe previousperiod.This assumption embeds the
restriction imposedby the null hypothesis jointly with a Markovian assumption. Note, too, that the
conditionalprobability istime invariant,whichmay be a strong restriction even though the
macroeconomicenvironment —theinflation rate —was quitestable during the period- Inasense
(A2')is the complement of (A2). Itassumesa particular type of time dependence for the {Xj
process, but restricts ittobe stationary over time, whereas (A2) allows for non-stationarity but25
assumes independence over time.
Under assumptions Al and AT we can dispense with the store and time subscripts and denote
the probability of a price change in productj conditional on as P/O) and P(l), according to
whether X isO or 1. The stochastic process {X} is a time-invariant Markov chain overt. There
are different chains for different products, but all stores follow identical processes. The one-step
transition probabilities matrix is
1-Plo) P/O) (7)
1-P/i) P/i)
Under assumptions Al and AT the maximum likelihood estimators of the one-step transition
probabilities are the row percentages in Table 3. In order to get the unconditional probabilities
appearing in (3) we need to know the probability distribution of the initial state Xe,. Given the initial
distribution we can obtain the unconditional probability of a price change at any time tin product
(1 P7)P/OY0 4P7Ppt'
(8)
where, say, p is the probability of a price change at t0 and P(O)° is the probability of a price
change at time t conditional on no price change at t =0.More precisely I1(O)m is the (0,1) element
in the t-step transition probabilities matrix 6'j° (6' multiplied by itself t times).
It turns out that the limiting probabilities r and I-I) of the Markov chains given by the
matrices in Table 3 are arrived at very rapidly. Irrespective of the values of the initial probabilities,
it takes at most 2 or 3 periods to get within three decimal places of the limiting probabilities. That is,
Pisveryc1oseto,rfort ￿ 3. Wethereforeuseestimatesofr1westimatePin(3). Theseare
given by26
* — P/o) (9) '
1+1/0)-P/i)
wherethe P are read off directly from Table 3. TableS summarizes the features of the different
estimates of Ps,. The entries are statistics corresponding to the distribution of the product-specific
estimates (X is the average of X over t).




WINES i 0.23 0.02 .20 .28
WINES 0.24 0.03 0.21 0.31
MEATS 0.53 0.07 .38 .61
MEATS 0.53 0.07 0.40 0.62
There doesnotseem to be much difference between the two ways of estimating P. In
addition, the small stancJarcj deviations of the estimates indicate that there is not much variation in
across products. This feature is important since it implies that w1 Is close to a binomial random
variable under the null hypothesis.
It should be noted that the absence of within-store synchronization does not rule out the
possibility that a large proportion of products behave in the same way. This is, in fact, expected dueto the high level of inflationduringthe period. Lack of synchronization merely says that the joint
probabilityof is the product of themarginal probabilities ftreachproduct: it canbe
anything between0and 1.
Thetest in (5)wasconducted 17times, foreach month from February 1978tillJune 1979,
using X, and i) in place of ?. Table 6 presents the numberof rejections at aS and10 percent
significance level.
Table 6: Oil-square tests of within-store synchronization
















As mentioned above, the version of thetestusingX as the estimator of? has a simple
interpretation: it compares a measure of within-storesynchronization('pj)withan average measure of
across-stores synchronization. The latter is based on 4theproportion of stores changing the price
of product j during a month, which was, in fact, used to characterS across-stores staggering in
SectionIA.
If within-store synchronizationis theresult ofa matching betweenthe productssoldby the
store and an inflationary shockthen bothandX should followsimilarpatterns. In addition,
heterogeneityinthe inflation process, across productsor overtime,shouldnot cause much of a
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difference between 'pand4Put differently, the results of the test mean that the observed within-
store synchronization is unrelated to the actual path of inflation. Since within-store synchronization
does not mirror the inflationary process the reasons for its existence lie somewhere else.
The above arguments can be depicted grapblcally once we restrict the process {Xj to be iid
over stores, products and time. Then 'pand;areidentically distributed for any i, j and t. Figure
5 shows the histograms of 'pandXin the sample. Note that for both wines and meat products, the
distribution of 'phasthicker tails than the distribution of X. In particular, the mass at 0 and at 1, is
signiftcantly higher for 'pthanfbr X. As mentioned above, if the observed pattern of 'pmerely
reflected the inflationary process, the same should be true of X. Figure 5 strongly rejects this
possibility.
If the unconditional probability of a price change is the same across products, then, under the
null hypothesis, the numberofprice changes in each store at any month should be distributed as a
binomial random variable with parameters kandthe common probability P_ or P for wines and
meat products, respectively!4 Table 5 indicates that this assumption may be appropriate for our data
and,infact, we can estimate P and P either by; averaged over products or by the average of i)
overproducts.
Asmentioned at the beginning of this section, the most compelling evidence in favor of
within-store synchronization in the timing of price changes is given by the frequent occurrence of the
events cp= 0and 'p= I.We are now in a position to compare the observed frequencies of these
events (Table 4) with the expected frequency under the binomial asswnption.
For each value of GI￿3 and for every moath we compute the binomial probabilities of
observing zero and GJ price changes using the estimated P, and P,,, These probabilities are
multiplied by the number of stores selling IGjproducts to obtain the expected frequency of zero or
2Thi holds for any finite value of the sample sizeI Oj price changes in each month. Within-store synchronization predicts that the observed
frequencies will be higher than the expected ones. Table 7 corroborates this prediction.























B. Pairwise correlation in the timing of once changes
Sofar our approach to the measurement of within-store synchronization captures behavior
withina period.Another —perhapsmore dynamic —approachis the co-evolution of two different
products jandk, X and X1, within each store overtime.An additional implication of pairwise
independenceinthe timing of price changes is that the covariance over time between any two pairs of
products soldinthe samestoreis zero. This issueis analyzedinthissubsection,therebyputting
together,in some sense,theconcept of regular cyclicitywiththe static notion of within-store
synchronization.
We focus our analysis on the behavior of the cross-product We define the indicator
function Sjj,k) as follows: when both products behave similarly S(j,k) =1;else Sk(j,k) =0.That
is,wheneitherbothX, =X1,=lorX=X11,=0,S(j,k) =1.ThemeanvalueofSj(j,k)over
time, S.jj,k), is the proportion of synchronization or matching between two products jandIc in stone
2930
Over all stores and pairs of distinct products we obtained 579 and 1069 SLQ,k)'S kr wines
and meat products, respectively. Table 8 displays features of the distribution of SL(J,k). Recall that
within-store synchronization implies "high' values of 5L
Table8 Cumulative distribution of SL(J,k)
E
II
N MEAN MR45% 10% 25% 50% MAX
WINES579 0.867 0.3330.5880.6670.8000.8891.000
MEATS 1069 0.581 0.0000.2730.3640.4710.5881.000
A rough benchmark figure fbr the expected proportion of matchings, Sjj,k), under the
assumption of no within-store synchronization can be obtained from Table 5. For wines we are led to
expect an S(j,k) around 0.0576 (= 0.242) and no larger than 0.0961 (= 0.312), while kr meat
products Sjj,k) should hover around 0.281 (= 0.532) and no more than 0.384 (0.622). It is clear that
the observed proportions of matchings are larger than the expected ones.
Clearly, meat products and wines do not behave in the same way. Recall that we are
analyzing the same time period in each product so that the stores selling these products operate in the
same macroeconomic environment. It may be that aggregate variables, such as those related to
monetary expansion, or even the average rate of inflation, transmit into meat products with much
more noise.Inother words, meat products are subject to more idiosyncratic shocks. This may be
This, of course, does not constitute a formal testing procedure. Within-store synchronization means that the
joint probability of observing a price change in productsj It equals the product of the marginal probabilities of
a price change in goods j and It. ris t covaS over tint between X, and X4] is zero. Testing
for zero covariancas is not pursued here because (a) it is difficult to assigns reliable standard enor to the estimator
of the covariance since it depends on the serial correlation pattern of each (XJ sequence, and (b) a formal
procedure would be based on large sample theory whose finite-sample properties are unknown. This is a problem
since each S.Q It) is an avenge of at most 17 observations and usually much less than that.31
responsible, at least in part, for the fact that synchronization within the store is not as complete in
stores selling meat product as it is in liquor stores.
5. Nentive and positive Drice changes
This section examines the co-existence of positive and negative nominal price changes within
the store. The phenomenon of negative nominal changes during a period of high inflation is
interesting. With an Inflation rate of about 3.9 percent a month, one Is tempted to think that very few
nominal prices, if any, are likely to adjust downward. Our data show that this is not so. About 12
percent of all changes in our sample are downward changes in this period (It.! percent in meat
products and 14.7 percent in wines).
In the literature on equilibrium distributions of real prices the assumption of relative two-sided
(idiosyncratic) shocks is usually invoked to generate a stable distribution of the relative prices. It is
therefore comforting to know that even when aggregate shocks generate a fairly high rate of inflation,
there seems to be evidence pointing towards the presence of Idiosyncratic shocks in the opposite
direction.' Note, however, that a downward adjustment of nominal prices cannot, by itself, Imply
the existence of idiosyncratic shocks. It Is the co-existence of price reductions of individual products
and a positive and stable inflationary process that suggests the presence of strong idiosyncratic shocks
in addition to the aggregate shock?"
Tsiddon (1993) and Caballero and Engel (1991) present models based on two-sided shocks.
Recall that the standard deviation of the monthly rate of inflation is 1.9 percent. To ace whether negative
shocks come from a distribution of idiosyncratic shocks or from aggregate shocks we ran a serie, of regressions
of the number of negative nominal price changes across all stores on the unexpected component of inflation (both
in linear and in linear-quadratic forms). We could not detect • single equation that shown negative coefficient.
Negative price changes are not related to negative surprises in the rate of inflation. We therefore conclude that the
source for these changes is idiosyncratic.
"An alternative interpretation may be the occurrence of 'salee not related to shocks of any type. CssuaI
examination leads us to believe that 'nIce are not a common phenomenon in grocery stores in Israel. They are
more prevalent in supermarkets which, however, are not included in our data.32
We have argued before that within-store synchronization can result from the existence of
store-specific costs ofadjustingprices. However, there may be other explanations for this
observation. One competing hypothesisisthatmonetaryshocks are distributed unevenly across
geographical regions. As we shall see, the timing of the negative nominal price changes offers a
viable way of contrasting the two hypotheses.
Suppose there exist idiosyncratic shocks that are independently distributed across products as
welt as across stores. Suppose that a store observes' a negative shock in the market for product j.
Ifthere were no store-specific component to the costs of adjusting prices, then the store would adjust
the price of product jdownwardonly at the moment the product-specific negative shock arrives. This
implies that the timing of negative price changes is uncorrelated with the tuning of positive price
changes.
If a negative shock to a particular product in a specific store coincides with a positive regional
monetary shock affecting the store -theunevenly distributed shock —thenthere are weaker
incentives to accommodate the negative idiosyncratic shock since it is partly or fitly compensated for
by the positive regional shock. In this case, the timing of negative and positive changes in prices
within a store ought to be necativelv correlated.
All the above implications hold under the assumption of no store-specific adjustment costs. If
there are store-specific costs to changing prices, the store should try to bunch together negative and
positive changes in prices, imj,lying a nositive correlation between the timing of positive and negative
price changes.
Figure 6 presents the degree to which the timing of positive and negative price changes
coincide.The horizontaj axis shows the proportion of negative price changes that occur
simultaneously (in the same month) with positive price changes within the same store. The vertical
"Note,however,that thedata werecollectedin Israel, whose area is just under 22,000 square km.33
axis indicates the frequencycounts. In 40 stores all negative price changes coincided withpositive
pricechanges. In II stores there were negative price changes only when there were no positive
ones. We interpret the left-skewness of Figure 6 as favoring the menu-cost explanation of the
existence of within-store synchronization over the explanation of a geographically uneven macro
shock.
6.Interpretation of the evidence
Our analysisofthedataindicatesthat thetiming of price changesissynchronized within each
storebut that storesare staggered overtimein quotingnewprices.We believe thatthesefindings
lendgreater support to some theories of price dynamics than to others. In this section we comment
on how different theories fittheseresults.
A. Menu costs models
The menucost paradigm isconsistent with our findings when these adjustment costs satisfy
the following requirements: (i) they are significant to the seller, in the sense that they are not to be
incurred continuously, and (ii) some component of these costs Is store-specific. The adjustment costs
are, therefore, not exclusively a result of the characteristics of each product but also of the
characteristics of the price-seuer. This last requirement will induce a store to synchronize its price
changes. The term menu cost comes alive: the cost of printing a new menu is shared by all
products. If such store-specific costs are indeed important, then single-product menu cost models
may give a very distorted picture of price dynamics.
Note, however, that store-specific costs should induce synchronization only in the timing of
price changes, but should not carry implications as to the size of the price changes for individual
'301these, 7 areliquorstores and 4 are stores seiling meat producis.34
products. This justifiesourfocus on the synchronization In the timing of such changes.
B. Inftrrnational externalities
Another explanation that fits the within-store synchronization of price changes is based on
informational externalities. Bait and Cecchetti (1988)discussa mechanism in which each price-setter
derivesinformationon inflationary pressures from observing the decisions made byotherprice-setters
when they change prices. They show that such an externality can generate an equilibrium with
staggered price-setting.
This explanation does not contradict the menu cost hypothesis. In conjunction with the menu
cost explanation, it amplifies the within-store-synchronization phenomenon, and yields an intuitive and
plausible mechanism that explains staggering across stores.
C. Sivial extraction models
Lucas's (1973) explanation that stores change most of their prices in response to a
macroeconomic shock, e.g., an unexpected monetary expansion, does not fit the data well. If the
shock is perceived by all agents at the same time (i.e., if there is no asymmetric information) all
stores will respond in a synchronized fashion, leading to across-store synchronization. The lack of
synchronization observed in Figures 1 does not support this implication. It would be very difficult to
suggest a convincing argument whereby macro shocks lead to within-store synchronization but not to
across-store synchronization. Hence, within-store synchronization cannot be the result of macro
shocks.
One way of reconciling this model with the findings is that the effects of macro shock are
unevenlydistributedgeographically, say, with different factor loadings in different locations. Moving
away from a pure macro shockcanpotentially generate the across-store staggering and within-store35
synchronizationobserved in the data. This explanation was considered in Section 5,wherewe
documented the coexistence of positive and negative price changes withinthesame store. The data
seem to reject the geographic hypothesis as well.
We do not interpret the data as suggesting that the effects of partial information on price
dynamics are minimal. The data only suggest that at high rates of inflation the economic implications
of incompleteinformation areovershadowed by the economic implications of the existence of friction
in setting new prices. Thus, this is simply another costly aspect of inflation: at high rates of inflation
price-setters must pay more attention to frictions than to gathering and processing information.
Inflation therefore makes price-setting a more mechanical process. We will return to this issue later.
D. Sticker once model
Diamond (1993) proposes yet another mechanism to Justify the sluggishness of the aggregate
price level: identical products may have different prices since prices are set at the time of delivery to
the store and remain unchanged unless a crucial change in the environment occurs. Our data do not
support this hypothesis; for it to be consistent with our findings one needs to assume that all products
are delivered simultaneously to each store so as to generate within-store synchronization, and that
there is a non-degenerate distribution of delivery dates across stores. This distribution should be
widely spread-out in order to generate the observed across-stores staggering in the timing of price
changes, which was defined on a monthly basis. These are strong assumptions, that are unlikely to
hold for the type of products analyzed here.
E. Search theory
In L&T we showed that the price dispersion in each Qiomogeneous) product market is very
large. Consequently, consumers have incentives to search for the lowest price. There Is, in fact, a36
richliterature connecting search theory to inflation but most of its implications cannot be addressed
with our data.
Search, however, is not confined to consumers only. In an Inflationary and uncertain
environment, sellers also are not folly aware of nominal price changes and, therefore, every new
price quotation brings new information on market conditions to consumers and sellers alike.
To the best of our knowledge no model exists, as yet, in which consumers and sellers search
in the context of multiproduct rums. Hence, we can only conjecture about the constraints such a
model would impose on the data. In broad terms and mainly from an Information-gathering
perspective, staggering price changes within the firm amounts to following a sequential search
procedure; synchronization of price changes is analogous to a fixed sample search approach. It is
well known that, under fairly general conditions, sequential search is a better strategy. In our dataset,
nevertheless, we find that stores synchronize the timing of their products' price changes, i.e., they
choose the fixed sample approach.
Two possible explanations of this paradox can be advanced. First, the environment may be
very volatile and little, or nothing, can be inferred from observations of one product on the others.
Second, the existence of frictions at the store-level make the staggering of price changes a very costly
alternative. Both explanations are not mutually exclusivç both may render a sequential search
strategy non-optimal.
Moreover, since relative price volatility is partly attributed to frictions in price setting (L&T),
these frictions seem to haveavery close connection to the fact that there is no sequential search.
This, however, is merely another manifestation of what was noted earlier: as inflation increases,
frictions become more important, and behavior becomes more mechanical.
To sum up. we believe the empirical findings of within-store synchronization and of across-
stores staggering are important because, first, they validate the assumption made in much of the37
sticky priceC literature that decisions are staggered across price-setters, and not across products.
Second, theyprovidefurther empirical support for the conjecture that price rigidity is due to
mechanical reasons, i.e.,to menucosts, and not to informational asymmetries. And last, they
indicate thatfurtherresearchonthedynamics ofpricesshould take into account the multiproduct
characterof the price-setter.
7. The store-snecificmenu costs hynothesis
Accepting the viewthatwithin-store synchronization in the timing of price changes emerges,
at leastin part,asaresult oftheexistence of a store-specific component inthecost ofadjusting a
price quotationraisessome interesting issues. Although menu cost models for amultiproduct price-
setterhave received little attentionfromthe theoreticalperspective,3'we heuristicallyderivesome
simple restrictionsonthe databyextendingthelogic of the single productmodel.
It iscommonlybelievedthat the existenceofsmall pricechanges constitutes evidence against
themenu cost proposition. It follows thatifmanysmall changes are observed, the menu cost
paradigm has verylittle (if anything)to say about actual price dynamics. This deduction, however,is
notapplicablein a multiproductsetting.
lithefixed costs associated with the price-setter, relative to those associated with the product,
are the domin'int component, thenthewell-known (S,s) policy in its narrow definition is no longer
optimal. While prices still change discontinuously, one should expect fairly little regularity in the size
of the price change of each product?2
To illustrate this point, consider the case in which the only adjustment costs are those attached
See Sulein(1986) andSheshinsjcj and Weiss (1992).
'Thiscontradicts the conclusion ofthesingle product case. In that case, the (S,s) boundaries an fixed as long
as the chasactexistics ofinflationtiefixed.Thus with a (stochastically) stable inflation one expects a constant
proportional change in price.38
tothe price-setter. If a decision is made to change prices, then the prices of allproducts are changed.
i.e.,perfectwithin-store synchronization is the rule.Aslongasidiosyncratic shocks are significant
relative to aggregate inflation,whena price-setter decides to change (alt) prices the magnitude of the
change in each product's price can be anything: some prices may change more than others or may
change in opposite directions. The onty common fact is that In all these changes, each price is set to
its optimal level. In addition, if store-specific costs are large, an appropriate weighted-average of
price changes within a store should also be large.n In the more general case, when the costs of
adjustment include a component associated with each product, some prices may not change at all or
may change on different dates, implying less than perfect within-store synchronization, but the rule
that conditional on a change, the average change should be large, still holds.
Having no information on sales or on the cross-derivatives of the profit function, we use the
arithmetic average of price changes as a proxy for the correct weighted-average of price changes.
Note that we restrict ourselves to positive price changes. Let DP1,bethe percentage change in the
price of product j in store i during month t and select those observations for which DPijt > 0. The
average change within store i Is given by DP11,
DP=-i E DPu (10)
whereGkis thesetofproductswhoseprices changedduringmonthtlnstorelandGk ￿ 3. Table9
characterizes the distribution of DP over stores.
°The appropriate weight is the weight that accounts not only for the sales of the product but also for the effect
of the change in the product's price on total revenues and Weiss, 19fl).Table 9 Cumulative distribution of DP1
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N MEAN M1N5% 10% 25% 50% MAXJ
WINES148 0.139 0.0070.0150.0270.0590.1040.558
MEATS 744 0.090 0.0060.0310.0410.0580.0811.016
Since the average monthly inflation rate was 3.9 percent, we could use this number to define
a "smalr price change. In wines, 15.5 percent of the average price changes are small while in meat
products the corresponding figure is 9.1 percent." A comparison of each DP1 to the corresponding
monthly rate of aggregate inflation (CPI) indicates that 11 percent of the changes in liquor stores are
less than the inflation rate, while fbr stores selling meat products this figure is 14 percent. Insum,
only between 10 and 15 of all avengepricechanges are "small according to the definition
employed.
While small price changes in specific products are not evidence against menu cost models in
the multiproduct firm setting, the fact that small average changes within each store are infrequent
reconfinns our previous conclusion that the phenomenon of within-store synchronization is, at least in
part, due to significant store-specific menu costs.
Theory provides other restrictions that should be satisfied by the data if within-store
synchronization is related to store-specific menu costs. The main implication is that DP should be
positively affected by expected inflation and not related to unexpected inflation. In fact, the mean
of DP over all stores and months increases from 9.8 percent in 1978-1979:6 to 11.9 percent in 1981-
1982. At the same time, the average monthly inflation rate mounted from 3.9 percent to 7 percent.
The relationship between DP and unexpected inflation was examined via a regression of DP
3'Inliquor stores, 23 price changes were less than 3.9 percent. 39 percent of then occur in 3 months (May
1978, and Febniazy and March 1979). In dotes selling meat products, 68 price changes were below 3.9 percent;




onunexpected inflation and its square. In all the regressions, for meat products and wines separately,
withandwithoutstore dummies,the coefficient of theunexpectedpart of Inflation Is statistically not
significant?
8.Conclusion
Aprice-setter usually sets prices for many different products. This obvious fact is an aspect
of price-setting behaviorwhichhas been neglected in most of the theoretical and empirical work on
the subject. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to this issue. We do this by empirically
investigating a rich body of data on prices of meat products and wines collected at the store level in
Israel.
The data show that when stores -price-setters-changeprices, they change the prices of
most of the products they sell. That is, there exists within-store synchronization in the timing of price
changes. In addition, stores are staggered in the timing of their price changes. These findings justify
the use of staggered price-setting mechanisms in the debate over the role of monetary policy.
We also contrast the implications of some of the prominent models of price-setting behavior
with the data. Among the potential explanations, the one suggested by the menu cost model seems to
be the one most consistent with the data. While we do not formally test the menu cost model against
the other alternatives models we tend to conclude that, at least for foodstuffs, the menu cost approach
describes the data well. The iesuits from TAT reinforce this conclusion.
'Theseries on unexpected inflation is the one used in TAT. Te consesve space we do not report the results
of these regressions, which are analogous to those appearing in L&T.41
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TABLE Al: SIMULTANEOUS PRICE CHANGES: WINES
Store K Share ofth.er of
Coetitor, Products
I 7.27 0.45 7
2 5.38 0.29 3
3 5.64 0.36 8
4 5.00 0.34 1
5 6.16 0.36 5
6 4.00 0.44 I
7 5.76 0.35 9
8 2.83 0.20 5
9 5.37 0.28 2
10 5.31 0.30 5
11 9.00 0.53 3
12 8.77 0.57 8
13 12.00 0.48 1
14 3.50 0.22 8
15 7.90 0.46 7
16 5.25 0.30 4
17 8.00 0.42 2
18 9.08 0.61 6
19 7.00 0.32 1
20 9.09 0.57 9
21 7.57 0.39 3
22 4.85 0.35 4
23 5.08 0.34 8
24 7.88 0.51 6
25 13.00 0.87 1
26 9.13 0.52 6
27 4.33 0.23 3
28 6.33 0.43 2
29 6.67 0.58 1
30 3.60 0.23 1
31 8.21 0.54 8
32 8.28 0.52 8
33 8.02 0.55 9
34 5.00 0.29 1
35 6.00 0.33 4
36 8.15 0.51 7
37 6.30 0.41 8
38 5.46 0.36 9
39 3.80 0.24 7
40 14.00 0.61 1
Notes:
i s the nuter of stores cMnging price of proOjct J in .onth t sinLt.neousty with store
I. %, •versged aver the afler of products j sold by store I and over the ntmter of months
in .4,ich these products tere sold.
The shar, of co.ipetitors equatsdivided by the nuter of stores seLtin product j during
month I minus I, aversged over products .rC months.TASLE A2: SIMULTANEOUS PRICE CHANGES: MEAT PRODUCTS
stor.ii, ShariofN'.tr ofStore I5Shin, ofNuiterof
Coiip.t$tor.PnoOcti CetIton.Pro&acts
1 17.96 0.60 6 46 17.98 0.58 4
2 8.560.57 3 47 8.22 0.49 2
3 8.950.57 3 48 15.22 0.57 1
4 8.00 0.52 1 49 17.93 0.59 9
5 16.71 0.49 4 50 7.00 0.37 1
6 18.79 0.61 6 51 17.79 0.55 8
7 13.97 0.39 5 52 15.17 0.56 1
8 15.00 0.67 1 53 14.25 0.66
9 18.28 0.61 7 54 18.11 0.60 6
10 20.18 0.59 6 55 17.66 0.56 8
11 7.71 0.51 3 56 18.92 0.59 6
12 18.05 0.55 4 57 8.25 0.52 3
13 8.08 0.55 3 58 23.40 0.68 5
14 18.61 0.58 7 59 7.61 0.53 2
15 8.56 0.54 3 60 16.00 0.38
16 17.48 0.58 9 61 18.22 0.58 3
17 6.80 0.38 2 62 19.12 0.62 9
18 9.35 0.58 2 6.3 18.60 0.81 5
19 16.23 0.52 9 64 18.40 0.60 3
20 17.27 0.51 4 65 15.75 0.53 8
21 16.98 0.48 2 66 15.84 0.57 7
22 1.460.67 1 67 18.82 0.58 7
23 8.150.58 2 68 18.76 0.63 9
24 8.13 0.55 I 69 16.66 0.59 4
25 8.48 0.53 3 70 7.87 0.49 3
26 14.96 0.54 2 71 7.33 0.45 I
27 17.900.58 3 72 ¶8.09 0.60 8
28 16.65 0.51 2 73 9.33 0.56
29 19.00 0.43 1 74 19.11 0.60 7
30 18.280.57 2 75 20.45 0.64 7
31 22.57 0.54 2 76 20.01 0.61 4
32 17.61 0.54 2 77 18.15 0.58 8
33 18.100.58 8 78 16.52 0.46 4
34 11.95 0.55 8 79 18.18 0.55 5
35 18.710.57 7 80 7.67 0.43 1
36 9.430.63 3 SI 18.03 0.59 9
37 8.750.57 3 82 19.00 0.71 2
38 22.750.58 3 83 17.81 0.55 2
39 19.400.59 6 84 17.300.57 8
40 8.050.43 2 85 20.13 0.58 4
41 17.33 0.57 8 86 19.29 0.58 4
42 19.98 0.58 3 87 19.24 0.64 3
43 15.05 0.57 I 88 10.13 0.63 3
44 9.02 0.56 3 89 16.50 0.61 ¶
45 16.87 0.56 9 90 12.38 0.51
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The entries are the i,ico.CitIw.t prthabitittn of tervirq • spell of X ca,ncutlve p.fc. changes,
17. Se. Ihe text for details. A •isslng value attSIcatn that there were no data w'
price changes for nre then C consecutive.the.
CTcict do CII CU CU C14 CIS C16 C17
a a a a :
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . .
o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a a a a a a a a a a
o 0 . . . . .
0 0 . . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 . . .
a a a a : :
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 . . ...
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 . . . .
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 . .
o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 . . . . .
o a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a a a a a a a a a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes:TABLE A4: CONSECUTIVE PRICE CHANGES: MEAT PRODUCTS
SICRE C23 C4 CS coC? 6 C9 dO CII C12 C13 d14 CU C16CIT
I 0.030.140.19 0 0
2 0.31 0 0.11 0 0
3 0.180.180.130.13
4 0.33 0 0 0 0
5 0 0.500 0 0
6 0.180.150.07 0 0
7 0.220 0 0
8 0.500 0 0
9 0.160.190.19 0
10 0.170.100 0 0
11 0.130.270.220.29 0
12 0.080.130 0 0
13 GA? 0.080 0 0
14 0.230 0 0.07 0
15 0.360.220 0.20 0
16 0.150.080.070 0
17 0 0 0 0 0
18 0.290 0.250 0
19 0.160.170.310.090.14
20 0.290.290 0 0
21 0.140 0 0.330
22 0.200 0 0 0
23 0.180.290 0
24 0.250.500 0 0
25 0.300.140.200.25
26 0.22 0.140 0
27 0.170 0.110 0
28 0.20 0 0.170 0
29 0.17 0 0 0 0
30 0.300 0.330 0
II 0.100.140.200 0
32 0.200.140 0 0
33 0.210.110.100.050
34 0.180.050.070 0
35 0.15 0 0.240.130
36 0.31 0 0 0 0
37 0.15 0 0.290 0
38 0 0.130 0 0
39 0.040.280.360 0







47 0.130 0.250 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
o a 0 0
& a a a
a a a 6
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
o 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0
a a a a
0
0 0 0 0
a a a a
a a a a
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0.17 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0.140 0 0
0:13 a a a
a a a a































0.100 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 . . . .
a a 0:20 a a a
a a a a a a
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.170 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.00. .
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 .
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.50 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.17 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.50
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0.060.07 0 0.14 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0.05 0 0.11 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0.130 0 0.11 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0TABLE A4: (continued)
ST0E C2 C3 C4 CS C6 c,
41 0.120.100.130.07 0.16 0.06
49 0.090.110.300.050.170
50 0 . .
51 0.180.080.050.06 0 0
52 0.250.110.160.04 0 0
530 0 1.00 0
54 0.130.190.060.130.100.20
55 0.230.070.100 0 0
56 0.20 .. 0.200.100 0
57 0.130.200.140 0 0.33
58 0.31 0 0 0 0 0
59 0.25 0 0 0 0
60. . .
61 0.28 0 0.560 0 0
62 0.230.130 0 0 0
63 0.26 0 0 0.130.330
64 0.11 0 0 0 0 0
65 0,170.16 0.130 0.130
66 0.010.240.140.180 0
6? 0.390.140 0 0.110
68 0.130.110.080 0 0
69 0.170.310 0 0.130
70 0.210.22 0 0 0 0
710 0.25 0 0.500 0
72 0.040.030.090.090.070.13 no o 0 0 0
74 0.200.130.160 0 0
75 0.200.07 0.100.050.080
76 0.200.29 0.180 0 0
7? 0.230.030.080 0 0
78 0.110.08 0.110.110 0.17
79 0.190.11 0 0.180 0.14
80 1.00 0 0
81 0.200.17 0.22 0 0 0
82 0.17 0 0 0 0 0
63 0.14 0 0.330 0 0
84 0.090.130.090.090.06 0
85 0.090.07 0 0.09 0 0
56 0.220.09 0 0 0 0
87 0.170.08 0 0 0 0
88 0.130 0.25 0 0 0
89 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 900 0 0 0 0 0
Cs C9 do Cli C12 C13 CU C15 C16 Cl?
0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
o a a a a a a a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17
a a a a a a a a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
o o 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 . .
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a a a a a a a a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 00 -0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a
0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0









































TIME PRcO1 PRW2 PR3PI4 PRWS PRX6 P2W? P2c08PRW9
3 2.0 . . 0 1.0 • 0.0 C
4 C • S I • 1.0 • 0.5 C
5 0.0 0.0 . • • 1.0 . 2.0 C
6 C C S S S C 2.0 C
7 • 1.0 I • C 0.0 • 2.0
8 2.7 2.5 • 5 • 2.3 • CM S
9 2.0 C 2 I 4.0 3.0 • 7.0 8
10 3.0 4.0 C • 2.5 4.0 • —.0 C
11 0.0 0.0 I 0 0.0 0.0 . 1.0 0
12 1.2 12.0 10 2 3.3 5.5 6 5.5 6
13 3.5 • I • 2.0 C 0 1.0 3
14 C C — 0 2.0 • 4 •.0 C
15 . . 0 0 5 C I
16 • 0.0 • 2 C C C 2.0 C
1? • 0.0 . — . 0.5 • 0.0 1
13 0.0 1.0 . . 0.0 0.5 0 2.0 1
Qoi-Prob(I,.1aOIX-11
Q11h'ob(X.1—I/—1J
TIME PRcO1 PRW2 PRW3 PRW4 PR5 PRW6 PRWT PRW8 PRT9
3 1.0 . C 0.0 1.0 C C 2.0 C
4 C • . 0.0 • 3.0 . 0.5 C
5 2.0 0.5 C C 0.0 • 2.0 C
6 C C C • C C C 2.0
7 C 6.0 - 3 S C 9.0 C 4.0 C
8 1.0 2.0 1.0 • 1.3 • C 8
9 2.5 C I 2.0 6.0 1.5 C 5.0 6
10 0.5 1.0 C C 0.5 1.0 . C C
Ii 3.7 13.0 9 8.0 5.5 12.0 C 12.0 5
12 0.5 2.0 3 0.3 0.3 2.0 0 1.5 I
13 1.0 C 4 • 1.0 C 4 0.5 4
14 . . C 0.0 0.0 • I
IS C C C 1.0 0 C I C C
16 C 0.0 . 0.0 . C C 1.0 C
17 C 1.0 • • • 0.5 C 0.5 2
18 3.7 7.0 • C 4.0 3.0 7 4.0 11
Note:C in4Icatei that th,probabilityIn the deao.Instor Is aro.
indicates that utlasta of .jth.j th. dw,o.lnator or the marator or both arC
missing because




TIME PR001 PRW2 PROO3PR004PRts5P1004 Pits? Pi008 PR009 P10010 P10011 P10012
31.252.137.001.331.507.001.000.470.730.351.001.17
40.401.200.171.000.751.2$0.131.561.400.360.33 2.50
50.431.401.000.672.001.17 0.800.601.500.100.50 2.00 60.944.501.331.004.002.501.000.901.250.530.70•
71.201.750.750.201.250.601.200.581.670.500.754.00
80.19 0.330.570.801.000.711.330.332.500.750.301.00
90.08 0.700.600.671.000.400.100.390.13 0.15 0.29 0.07
100.57 0.831.500.800.290.890.58 0.140.75 0.57 0.57 0.31 Ii0.180.171.002.000.670.151.17 0.610.54 0.860.500.42
121.382.731.001.50 •0.391.600.911.22 0.88 3.250.13
130.861.001.670.001.00 3.002.000.38 0.831.001.000.15
141.401.002.001.750.402.506.000.412.33 0.001.670.50
150.250.272.502.502.00 0.501.251.09 2.001.80 0.830.75





TIMEPR001 P1002 P1003 P1004 P1005 P1006 PitS? P1008 P1009 P10010 P10011P10012
34.000.385.001.67 2.00 7.001.000.180.180.003.000.17
41.001.401.331.501.502.251.380.780.600.431.112.00
50.571.200.140.330.67 1.330.401.101.000.290.501.00 60.354.001.331.008.001.000.571.000.750.130.40 •
71.002.001.750.401.001.200.600.6?1.330.500.75 10.00 80.631.000.140.400.751.002.330.733.000.880.802.20
90.501.301.000.331.500.600.80 0.441.130.500.5? 0.50
100.09 0.750.25 0.80 0.57 0.670.08 0.320.78 0.000.070.06
110.451.282.00 0.67 0.17 0.691.330.170.731.140.700.42
120.080.180.801.00 0.110.200.550.22 0.000.250.33
130.712.001.00 2.00 2.500.402.500.920.671.67 3.000.23
141.801.382.50 0.75 0.402.506.000.352.00 0.50 2.000.20
151.421.072.001.501.00 4.002.000.642.00 0.801.830.63
160.281.001.001.60 0.670.241.670.861.17 0.860.270.42
170.640.001.50 0.30 2.00 0.270.570.502.40 0.600.560.45
181.097.000.130.43 0.630.361.171.291 2.00 4.001.290.67
Kate:a Indicate. th.t Itie probabilIty in the denainstor is zero.FIGURE 1:PROPORTION OF PRICE CHANGES
February 1978- June 1979
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